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1. Introduction
In this paper we solve the Knights and Spies Problem:
In a room there are n people, each labelled with a unique
number between 1 and n. A person may either be a knight
or a spy. Knights always tell the truth, while spies may either
lie or tell the truth, as they see fit. Each person in the room
knows the identity of everyone else. Apart from this, all that
is known is that strictly more knights than spies are present.
Asking only questions of the form:
‘Person i, what is the identity of person j?’,
what is the least number of questions that will guarantee to
find the true identities of all n people?
Despite its apparently recreational character, the Knights and Spies Prob-
lem is surprisingly deep; it is unusual to find such an easily stated problem
that can challenge and be enjoyed by professionals and amateurs alike.1
The following remarks introduce some basic ideas and should clarify its
statement.
1.1. Preliminary remarks. There is a simple, if inefficient, questioning
strategy that will find everyone’s identity. Assume for the moment that
n = 2m is even. Given a person i, if we ask the remaining 2m − 1 people
to state person i’s identity, then the majority opinion will be correct. For
otherwise, the majority consists of m or more people who have lied, and since
only spies can lie, they must be spies. With a small extension to deal with
ties in the case when n is odd, this gives us a strategy that finds everyone’s
identity in n(n− 1) questions.
We may refine this strategy by noting that anyone who ever holds a
minority view is a liar. Such people can be immediately identified as spies,
and then ignored as a potential source of information. Moreover, once we
have found a knight, we may bombard him with questions to find all the
remaining identities. However, even with these improvements, the number
of questions required in the worst case is still quadratic in n.
When this strategy is followed, the spies are at their most obstructive
when they always tell the truth. This phenomenon will be seen in other
contexts below. We may assume, however, that a spy will lie if asked about
Date: November 20, 2018.
1The author would like to thank Dave Johnson for telling him about the Knights and
Spies Problem in January 2007.
?Part of this work was financially supported by the Heilbronn Institute for Mathemat-
ical Research.
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2 MARK WILDON
his own identity, and so while it is permitted by the rules, there can be
no benefit in asking a person about themselves. Similarly, there can be no
benefit in asking the same question to any person more than once.
Before reading any further, the reader is invited to find a questioning
strategy that will use at most Cn questions for some constant C. A hint
leading to a strategy for which C = 2 is given in this footnote.2 The opti-
mal C is revealed in the outline below.
1.2. Outline. We shall solve the more general problem, where it is given
that at most ` spies are present for some ` with 1 ≤ ` < n/2. We begin
in §2 by describing the Spider Interrogation Strategy, which guarantees to
finds everyone’s identity using at most
n+ `− 1
questions. If, as in the original problem, all we know is that knights are
strictly in the majority, then ` = b(n− 1)/2c, and so the maximum number
of questions asked is f(n), where f is defined by
f(2m− 1) = 3m− 3
f(2m) = 3m− 2.
No matter which numbers they hold, the spies can force a questioner
following the Spider Interrogation Strategy to ask the full n+`−1 questions.
If however the spies are constrained to always lie, or to always answer ‘spy’,
then usually fewer questions are required. We determine the probability
distribution of the number of questions asked; remarkably it is the same in
either case. The proof is bijective, using two lemmas related to the well-
known ballot counting problem (see [2, III.1]).
In §3 we prove that any questioning strategy will, in the worst case, require
at least n + ` − 1 questions. Hence the answer to our original problem is
that, provided n ≥ 3, the smallest number of questions that can guarantee
success is f(n). Since
0 ≤ 3n/2− f(n) ≤ 2
for all natural numbers n, it follows that the optimal constant C is 3/2.
The proof in §3 is presented in terms of an optimal strategy for the second
player in the two-player game in which the first player poses questions (in
the standard form), and the second supplies the answers (‘knight’ or ‘spy’),
with the aim of forcing her opponent to ask at least n + ` − 1 questions
before she can be sure of everyone’s identity. This game provides a setting
for all the problems considered in this paper.
It is natural to ask whether there is a questioning strategy which never
uses more than n + ` − 1 questions, and will with reasonable probability
use fewer, no matter how cleverly the spies answer. In §4 we modify the
Spider Interrogation Strategy to show that such a strategy exists in the case
when ` is at most
√
n. (Of course, given the result of §3, there is always be
a non-zero probability that the full number of questions will be required.)
We then present some evidence for the conjecture that such a strategy exists
2There is an inductive strategy that starts by putting people into pairs, leaving one
person out if n is odd, and then asking each member of each pair about the other
KNIGHTS, SPIES, GAMES AND BALLOT SEQUENCES 3
for all admissible values of `. We end in §5 by briefly discussing two further
open problems.
2. The Spider Interrogation Strategy
2.1. Description. The Spider Interrogation Strategy has four steps: the
first step, in which we hunt for someone who we can guarantee is a knight,
is the key to its workings. We suppose that at most 1 ≤ ` < n/2 of the n
people in the room are spies.
Step 1. Choose any person as a candidate. Repeatedly ask new people about
the candidate until either
(a) strictly more people have said that the candidate is a spy than have
said that he is a knight, or
(b) ` people have said that the candidate is a knight.
If we end in case (a), with the candidate accused by a different people,
then he must have been supported by a− 1 different people. Whatever his
true identity, it is easily checked that at least a of the 2a people involved are
spies. Hence if we reject the candidate, ignore all 2a of the people involved
so far, and replace ` with `−a, we may repeat Step 1 with a smaller problem.
Eventually, since spies are in a strict minority, we must finish in case (b).
The successful candidate is supported by ` people, so must be a knight.
Step 2. Let person k be the knight found at the end of Step 1. All future
questions will be addressed to him. In this step, use him to identify each
person who has not yet been involved in proceedings, and also each of the
rejected candidates from Step 1.
Step 3. Let persons m1, . . . , mt be the rejected candidates whose identities
were determined in Step 2. Suppose that person mi was accused by ai
people.
(a) If person mi is a knight, then the ai people who accused him are
spies. Identify the ai − 1 people who supported him.
(b) If person mi is a spy, then the ai − 1 people who supported him are
spies. Identify the ai people who accused him.
Step 4. Finally, identify each person who supported person k’s candidacy.
Since the people who accused person k must be spies, everyone’s identity is
now known.
It will be useful to represent the progress of the Spider Interrogation
Strategy by a labelled digraph on the set {1, 2, . . . , n} in which we draw an
edge from vertex i to vertex j if person i has been asked about person j, and
label it with person i’s answer. We shall refer to such a graph as a question
graph. Figure 1 overleaf shows a typical question graph after Step 1 of the
Spider Interrogation Strategy. Its characteristic structure gives the Spider
Interrogation Strategy its name.
An interesting feature of the Spider Interrogation Strategy, already visible
in Figure 1, is that it guarantees that each spy in the room will be asked at
most one question.
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Figure 1: The question graph at the end of Step 1 of the Spider In-
terrogation Strategy in a 21-person room with ` = 10. Green arrows
show supportive statements and red arrows show accusations. Ques-
tions are numbered in bold. The candidates are S1 (rejected), K5
(rejected), S13 (rejected) and K15 (successful). Spies are assumed
to lie in all their answers, except for S17, who we suppose answers
truthfully when asked about K15. All future questions will be ad-
dressed to the knight K15. For instance, in Step 2 he will be asked
about S1, K5, S13, K20 and S21. The total number of questions
asked is 29.
2.2. On the number of questions asked. It is not hard to show that the
Spider Interrogation Strategy uses at most n + ` − 1 questions. In fact we
can easily prove something more precise.
Proposition 1. The total number of questions asked by a questioner fol-
lowing the Spider Interrogation Strategy is
n+ `− 1− r
where r is the number of knights rejected as candidates in its first step.
Proof. After Step 2 is complete, the underlying graph of the question graph
is a tree. Therefore n − 1 questions have been asked by this point. The
number of questions asked in Step 3 is a1 + · · · + at − r. The knight k
was accepted after `− (a1 + · · ·+ at) people supported him, hence the total
number of questions asked in Steps 3 and 4 is `− r. The result follows. 
Thus a questioner following the Spider Interrogation Strategy saves one
question from the maximum of n+ `− 1 every time a knight is rejected as a
candidate. The spies can easily make sure this never happens, most simply
by always answering truthfully. If however the spies always lie, or always
answer ‘spy’, then is is probable that fewer questions will be required. We
shall refer to these behaviours as knavish and spyish, respectively.
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Theorem 2. Suppose that there are k knights and s spies randomly arranged
in the room, and that the spies are constrained to act either knavishly or
spyishly. The probability that a questioner following the Spider Interrogation
Strategy asks exactly q questions is independent of the constraint on the spies.
In either case, the expected number of questions saved is
1(
k+s
s
) s−1∑
r=0
(
k + s
r
)
.
In particular, if k = s + 1 then the sum of binomial coefficients is 22s −(
2s+1
s
)
, and it follows from Stirling’s formula that the number of questions
saved is 12
√
pis− 1 + o(s). Hence, in a large room in which knights are only
just in the majority, a questioner following the Spider Interrogation Strategy
can expect to ask about
3n
2
−
√
pi
8
√
n
questions. Another asymptotic result worth noting is that when k = 2s,
the sum of binomial coefficients agrees in the limit with
(
3s
s
)
, and so the
expected number of questions saved tends to 1 as s tends to infinity.
Our proof of Theorem 2 is bijective, and does not give an explicit formula
for the probabilities involved. (Indeed, it seems unlikely that any simple
such formula exists.) Some idea of how these probabilities vary is given
by Figure 10 at the end of §4, which shows the results from a computer
simulation of rooms with 51 knights and 49 spies.
2.3. Paths. We shall represent the sequence of questions asked in Step 1 of
the Spider Interrogation Strategy by a path in which we step up every time
a knight is supported or a spy is accused, and down every time a knight
is accused or a spy is supported. An initial step, which could be thought
of as the candidate implicitly voting for himself, is taken whenever a new
candidate is chosen.
Rather than end the path when a candidate is accepted, we instead imag-
ine that we continue to question people about our accepted candidate until
5 10 15 20
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
Figure 2: The path corresponding to Step 1 of the Spider Interro-
gation Strategy in the 21-person room shown in Figure 1. The final
two steps correspond to extra questions asked to the knight K20 and
the spy S21 about the successful candidate K15. (We have supposed
that S21 lies.)
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everyone in the room has either been a candidate, or has been asked a ques-
tion. Thus our paths will always have exactly n steps. We give each path
with a given number of upsteps and downsteps the same probability; our ex-
tension of paths therefore mimics Fermat’s solution of the famous Proble`me
des Points (see [1, page 300] for an accessible account). Figure 2 shows the
path corresponding to the 21-person room in Figure 1.
We say that a path visits m from above at time r if its height after r
steps is m, and its r-th step is downwards. Thus the path shown in Figure 2
visits 1 from above exactly twice, at times 7 and 11.
Lemma 3. Let P be a path representing the questions asked in Step 1 of the
Spider Interrogation Strategy. There is a bijective correspondence between
visits of P to 0 from above and rejected knights in this step.
Proof. It suffices to prove that, once a candidate has been accepted, the
path never returns to 0. This is left to the reader as a straightforward
exercise. 
We need two further probabilistic lemmas on paths, each of some inde-
pendent interest.
Lemma 4. Let k ≥ s and let p ≥ 0. The probability that a path with k
upsteps and s downsteps visits m from above exactly p times is constant for
−1 ≤ m ≤ k − s.
Proof. Let 0 ≤ m ≤ k − s. We shall show that the probabilities agree
for m−1 and m. Let P be a path with k upsteps and s downsteps. Suppose
that the first time P visits m is after step b, and that the last time P visits m
is after step c. (Since m ≥ k − s, b and c are well-defined.) Reflecting the
part of P between b and c in the line y = m gives a new path, P ′. Figure 3
shows this reflection when m = 1 for the path in Figure 2.
b=5 c=1510 20
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
P
P ′
Figure 3: The path P ′ is the reflection of P in the line y = 1
between b = 5 and c = 15.
One easily sees that P visits m from above exactly as many times as P ′
visits m − 1 from above. Similarly P visits m − 1 from above exactly as
many times as P ′ visits m from above. The result follows. 
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Lemma 5. Let k ≥ s. The expected number of visits to −1 from above for
a path with k upsteps and s downsteps is
1(
k+s
s
) s−1∑
r=0
(
k + s
r
)
.
Proof. Let c(k, s) be the total number of times all paths with k upsteps
and s downsteps visit −1 from above. We must prove that
c(k, s) =
s−1∑
r=0
(
k + s
r
)
.
We work by induction on s. If s = 0 then it is impossible for any path to
visit −1, so the result obviously holds in this case.
For the inductive step we use reflection in a slightly different way, which
is, in fact, the standard way it is used.3 Let P be a path with k upsteps
and s downsteps which visits −1 from above at least once. If P visits −1
for the first time after step d, then reflect the part of P between 0 and d in
the line y = −1. This gives a new path P ? from (0,−2) to (k+ s, k− s), as
shown in Figure 4 below.
P
P ?−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
d5 10
Figure 4: The path P , which visits −1 for the first time after step
d = 7, is reflected to the path P ? starting at (0,−2).
If P visits −1 from above exactly m times then P ? visits −1 from above
exactly m − 1 times. Since there are (k+ss−1) possible paths P ? from (0,−2)
to (k + s, k − s), each with k + 1 upsteps and s− 1 downsteps, we have
c(k, s) =
(
k + s
s− 1
)
+ t
where t is the total number of times all paths from (0,−2) to (k + s, k − s)
visit −1 from above. Each such path has k+1 upsteps and s−1 downsteps.
Shifting to (0, 0) and applying Lemma 4 we see that t = c(k+ 1, s− 1). The
lemma now follows by induction. 
3Feller [2, Chapter 3], gives a good introduction to this reflection argument and its
possible applications.
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2.4. Proof of Theorem 2. The first part of this theorem asserts that
if there are k knights and s spies in the room, then the probability that
exactly q questions are saved is independent of whether spies act knavishly
or spyishly. As in Lemma 5, we shall work by induction on s.
The two behaviours for the spies differ only when a spy is asked about
another spy, so when s = 0 or s = 1, the probabilities agree. When s ≥ 2
we may use induction to reduce to the case where the first candidate is a
spy, and the first question is asked to another spy.
Suppose first of all that spies behave knavishly. Then, in a path corre-
sponding to Step 1 of the Spider Interrogation Strategy, questions asked to
knights correspond to upsteps, and questions asked to spies correspond to
downsteps, and the first two steps are downwards. By Lemma 3, the prob-
ability that exactly p knights are rejected is equal to the probability that
a path with k upsteps and s − 2 downsteps visits 2 from above exactly p
times.
Now suppose that spies behave spyishly. In this case our initial candidate
is rejected at question 2, and we choose a fresh candidate. By induction,
we may assume that all the remaining spies in the room behave knavishly.
The remaining questions in Step 1 are represented by a path with k upsteps
and s− 2 downsteps. Hence, the probability that exactly p knights are
rejected is the probability that a path with k upsteps and s− 2 downsteps
visits 0 from above exactly q times.
By Lemma 4 these two probabilities are equal. Moreover, by Lemma 5,
the expected number of visits to 0 from above of a path with k upsteps and s
downsteps is
1(
k+s
s
) s−1∑
r=0
(
k + s
r
)
.
When spies act knavishly, this is the expected number of questions saved. We
have just seen that the behaviour of the spies does not affect the distribution
of this quantity, so this is also its expected value when spies act spyishly.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
3. A lower bound
In this section we shall prove that any questioning strategy, will, in the
worst case, require at least n+`−1 questions to find everyone’s true identity.
The difficult we face in proving this result is that we must somehow take
into account every possible questioning strategy that may be employed,
irrespective of how bizarre it might seem. This is much the same problem
that confronts a player of a game such as chess or go, and so it is perhaps
not surprising that it is very helpful to think of our problem in this context.
3.1. A mathematical game. The game of ‘Knights and Spies’ is played
between two players: an Interrogator and a Secret-Keeper. At the start of
the game the players agree on values for the usual parameters n and `, with
as usual 1 ≤ ` < n/2.
In a typical turn the Interrogator poses a question (in the standard form)
to the Secret-Keeper. The Secret-Keeper considers the various ways in which
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knights and spies can be arranged in the room and then supplies the an-
swer: ‘knight’ or ‘spy’. The Interrogator’s aim is, of course, to determine
everyone’s identity. The Secret-Keeper acts as the agent of malign fate and
aims to answer in a way that will inconvenience the Interrogator as much
as possible.
If, at the beginning of a turn, the Interrogator believes that she is certain
of everyone’s identity, she may claim by giving the full set of people who she
believes are spies. The Secret-Keeper must then either refute her claim, by
exhibiting a different set that is also consistent with her answers so far, or
agree that the secret is out. The Interrogator wins if she makes a successful
claim before turn n+ `, and draws if she makes a successful claim at the
start of turn n+ ` (after asking n + ` − 1 questions). In any other event
victory goes to the Secret-Keeper.4
Note that the Secret-Keeper is not committed, even privately, to any
particular arrangement of knights and spies. All that matters is that, at
every point in the game, there is a way to assign identities to the people in
the room that is consistent with her answers so far, and with the requirement
that at most ` spies are present. The small-scale game shown in Figure 5
should clarify this point.
1
2
3 4
5
1
2
3
Figure 5: The question graph part way through a novice game in a 5
person room with ` = 2. Green arrows show supportive statements,
red arrows show accusations. For instance, in the first turn the
Interrogator asked person 1 about person 2, and the Secret-Keeper
accused by replying ‘spy’.
The Secret-Keeper’s third reply in this game was a blunder, for after it,
the Interrogator, reasoning that at most two spies are present, can be sure
that person 5 is a spy, and also that either person 1 or person 2 is a spy. She
4Practical experience suggests that it is all too easy for the Secret-Keeper to inad-
vertently answer in such a way that all consistent interpretations of her answers re-
quire strictly more than ` spies to be present. Such errors may be avoided by using
the author’s program Gamechecker, which makes an exhaustive search for an assign-
ment of identities consistent with the Secret-Keeper’s responses. It reports if there is
a unique such assignment, so it can also be used to adjudicate claims by the Interroga-
tor. The Haskell source code for Gamechecker is available from the author’s website:
http://www.maths.bris.ac.uk/~mazmjw. It would be interesting to know if there is a
polynomial time algorithm for deciding whether an incomplete game is in a consistent
state; the back-tracking algorithm used by Gamechecker works well in practice, but in the
worst case requires exponential time and space.
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will therefore be able to claim after just one more question. If the Secret-
Keeper had instead supported by replying ‘knight’ on her third turn, then
the Interrogator can be held to the target of six questions; the reader may
check that it is the Secret-Keeper’s choice whether one or two spies appear
in the Interrogator’s eventual claim.
Our required result, that any questioning strategy will, in the worse case,
require at least n+ `− 1 questions, is equivalent to the following theorem.
Theorem 6. The Secret-Keeper has a strategy that ensures the Interrogator
cannot claim before she has asked n+ `− 1 questions.
We refer the reader to [4, §10.1] for a formal axiomatisation of two-player
games which is more than capable of expressing Theorem 6.
3.2. The Mole Hiding Strategy. We prove Theorem 6 by showing that
the following two-phase strategy for the Secret-Keeper (referred to as the
Mole Hiding Strategy) will hold the Interrogator to n+ `− 1 questions. For
simplicity, we shall assume that the Interrogator never repeats a question
verbatim or asks someone to state his own identity; the discussion in §1.1
tells the Secret-Keeper how to reply to such questions, and shows that this
is not a significant restriction.
Phase 1. Answer the first ` − 1 questions posed by the Interrogator with
blanket accusations. Let G be the subgraph of the question graph whose
vertices correspond to people who have already been involved in one of the
first ` − 1 questions. Suppose that the underlying graph of G is the union
of the connected components G1, . . . , Gc. Let G′ be the set of people who
have not yet been involved in proceedings.
Phase 2. Now answer the Interrogator’s questions according to the follow-
ing rule. Suppose that the Interrogator’s question asks for the identity of
person j. If j belongs to G′ then support, and if j belongs to the compo-
nent Gi then accuse, unless in Phase 2 of the game the Interrogator has
already asked about everyone else in Gi; in this case, support.
An example game in which n = 12 and ` = 5 is shown in Figure 6 overleaf.
The subgraph G = {1, 2, 3} ∪ {4, 5} has two connected components. The
Interrogator can be sure after 16 questions that the only spies present are
persons 2, 3 and 5, but is unable to claim any earlier; the game therefore
ends in a draw.
The name of this strategy comes from the Interrogator’s time-consuming
search through G′ for hidden spies, and through G for hidden knights. The
proof of the following proposition shows that this search is unavoidable.
Proposition 7. If the Secret-Keeper follows the Mole Hiding Strategy then,
at every point in the game, there is a subset of people that can consistently
be the set of spies in the room. Moreover, at the beginning of each turn t
with t ≤ n+ `− 1, there are two different such subsets.
Proof. Suppose we are at the start of turn t. Since extra questions can
only increase the requirements a consistent assignment of identities to the
people in the room must satisfy, we may assume without loss of generality
that t ≥ `− 1. Hence the subgraph G is defined.
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Figure 6: A game in a 12 person room with ` = 5. The Secret-
Keeper adopts the Mole Hiding Strategy, and holds the Interrogator
to a draw. Questions are numbered in bold. The connected compo-
nent of the subgraph G are marked.
For each component Gi of G, if the Secret-Keeper has already asked about
everyone in Gi, then let person ki be the unique person who has been sup-
ported in Phase 2 of the game. Otherwise, choose for ki any person in Gi
who has not yet been asked about. Let
S = G \ {k1, . . . , kc} ,
and let K be the complement,
K = G′ ∪ {k1, . . . , kc} .
Let k ∈ K and let y ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. If the Secret-Keeper has told the
Interrogator that person k supports person y, then this question must have
occurred in Phase 2 of the game, and either y ∈ {k1, . . . , kc} or y ∈ G′.
Hence y ∈ K. Similarly, if the Secret-Keeper has told the Interrogator that
person k accuses person y, then y ∈ S. Hence, provided that S is not too
large, the Secret-Keeper’s answers are consistent with S being the full set
of spies.
Suppose that the connected component Gi contains vi people and has ei
edges. The number of questions asked in Phase 1 of the game is e1+· · ·+ec =
`− 1. By a standard result, ei ≥ vi − 1, and hence
|S| = (v1 − 1) + (v2 − 1) + · · ·+ (vc − 1)
≤ e1 + · · ·+ ec
= `− 1.
Therefore we even have one spy left to play with.
Now suppose that t ≤ n+ `−1. At most n−1 questions have been asked
in Phase 2 of the game, so there is some person, say person x, who has not
been asked about in this phase. We may assume that if x belongs to G, say
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with x ∈ Gi, then we chose ki = x. We shall use person x to construct a
set S?, different from S, that can also be taken as the set of spies. There
are two cases to consider.
If x 6∈ S then let S? = S ∪ {x}. By our choice of x, person x has never
been supported by anyone in the room, so it is consistent that he is a spy.
Since |S?| = |S|+ 1 ≤ `, it is consistent that S? is the set of spies.
If x ∈ S then let S? = S \ {x}. Person x has only been accused by people
in S?. Moreover, one easily checks that person x has accused only people
in S?, and supported only people not in S?. Hence it is consistent that
person x is a knight, and that S? is the set of spies. 
It follows from the first part of Proposition 7 that the Secret-Keeper can
adopt the Mole Hiding Strategy without breaking the rules of the game.
The second part shows that the Interrogator will be unable to claim before
she has asked n+ `− 1 questions. Theorem 2 is an immediate corollary.
3.3. Final remarks on the game. We end this section with two remarks
on the game we have introduced, each with a hint of the paradoxical.
Firstly, the author’s experience is that most players expect to find it easier
to play as the Secret-Keeper than the Interrogator, but, to their surprise,
find that after the first few games, the reverse is true. Since it is far from
obvious that n+ `− 1 questions suffice, this seems somewhat remarkable.
Secondly we note that the Mole Hiding Strategy is optimal (in the game-
theoretic sense) since it guarantees to hold the Interrogator to n+ `− 1
questions, which, given the existence of the Spider Interrogation Strategy,
is the best the Secret-Keeper can hope for. This is not to say however, that
the Mole Hiding Strategy cannot be improved. Its defect is that it does not
punish bad play on the part of the Interrogator as harshly as is possible.
For example, in the game shown in Figure 6, the Interrogator’s third
question was in fact a blunder, after which the Secret-Keeper can, by ex-
tending Phase 1 of the game for an extra question, force the Interrogator
to ask 17 questions. This changes the outcome of the game from a draw
into victory for the Secret-Keeper. More generally, if the Secret-Keeper is
willing to depart from the strict letter of the Mole Hiding Strategy, she can
win any game in which the Interrogator’s questions during Phase 1 form an
undirected cycle. It would be interesting to know what other early plays by
the Interrogator can be punished.
4. Cycles and chains
In §2 we noted that, no matter how the spies are arranged in the room,
they can ensure that a questioner following the Spider Interrogation Strategy
asks n + ` − 1 questions. It is natural to ask whether there is a question-
ing strategy which never uses more than n + ` − 1 questions, and also has
a reasonable probability of using fewer, no matter how cleverly the spies
answer.
4.1. A partial result. When ` is small compared to n this question—in one
interpretation at least—has an affirmative answer. This can be shown by
modifying the Spider Interrogation Strategy; we give the required changes
in outline.
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Step 1. Ask person 1 about person 2, then person 2 about person 3, and
continue in this manner, until either we meet an accusation, or we have
asked ` questions. In the latter case, person ` + 1 must be a knight. If we
simply ask him about everyone else in the room, then we find everyone’s
identity in n + ` − 1 questions. Moreover, if we begin by asking about
person 1 then, in the event that he transpires to be a knight, the resulting
cycle in the question graph tells us that the first `+1 people are all knights.
A further n − (` + 1) questions find all the remaining identities, giving a
total of just n questions.
In the former case, suppose that person t accused person t + 1. If t = 1,
then we have not yet departed from the normal Spider Interrogation Strat-
egy. If t > 1 then treat person t as a candidate who has been supported
by t− 2 people, and continue to question new people about him. If eventu-
ally he is rejected, after having been accused by a different people, then the
resulting spider contains 2(a + 1) people, of whom at least a + 1 are spies.
The threshold for acceptance of the next candidate is therefore `− (a+ 1).
Now follow Step 1 of the unmodified strategy.
Steps 2,3 and 4. These are analogous to the unmodified strategy. The reader
may check that, once the identity of person t has been determined, a + 1
questions suffice to find all the identities of the people in the first spider. It
therefore follows, along similar lines to Proposition 1, that it is possible to
determine everyone’s identities in n+ `− 1 questions. Figure 7 below shows
an illustrative example.
S1 S2
S3
K4
K5
S6
K7
K8
K9 K10
K11
1 2 3
4
5 6
7
8
Figure 7: The end of Step 1 in the modified Spider Interroga-
tion Strategy in an 11 person room with ` = 5, in which spies act
knavishly. The first candidate S3 is rejected, and the second K9 is
accepted. In Step 2, the knight K9 will be asked about S3 and K11,
and in the modified version of Step 3, he will be asked about his
fellow knights, K4, K5, K7, K8 and K10. The full 15 questions are
required.
The event that none of the first ` + 1 people in the room is a spy has
probability at least
g`(n) =
(
1− `
n− `
)`+1
.
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For fixed `, the lower bound g`(n) is an increasing function of n. Moreover,
h(`) = g`(`2) =
(
1− 1
`− 1
)`+1
is an increasing function of ` for ` ≥ 2, tending to 1/e as `→∞. Calculation
shows that h(9) ≥ 1/4, and hence g`(n) ≥ 1/4 whenever 9 ≤ ` ≤
√
n. We
can therefore use the modified Spider Interrogation Strategy to prove the
following conjecture, subject to the extra hypothesis that ` ≤ √n.
Conjecture 8. Let s ≤ ` < n/2. There is a questioning strategy which,
provided ` is sufficiently large, guarantees to use at most n+ `− 1 questions
to find all identities in an n-person room containing s spies, and will on
average use at most n+ 3`/4 questions.
The game-playing setting for Conjecture 8 is the variant form of ‘Knights
and Spies’, in which the numbers of the spies are randomly chosen at the
start of the game, and the Secret-Keeper’s only responsibility is to decide
on their answers. Note that the information that exactly s spies are present
is not revealed to the Interrogator, and need not by honoured by the Secret-
Keeper when refuting a claim. A similar conjecture, in which the number
of spies was itself a random quantity ≤ `, could also be stated.
The numerical results presented in the following section suggest that Con-
jecture 8 also holds when ` takes its largest possible value of b(n− 1)/2c.
4.2. The Chain Building Strategy. A chain of people, each of its mem-
bers supporting the next person along, is almost as valuable a configuration
as the cycle potentially created by the previous strategy. Any such chain
consists of a number (possibly zero) of spies, followed by a number (again
possibly zero) of knights. There are k + 1 possible configurations for a chain
of length k. Provided we have a knight to hand, its members can be identi-
fied using repeated bisection in a mere blog2 kc+ 1 questions; this meets the
theoretical minimum for binary questions. An example is shown in Figure 8
below.
S1 S2 K3 K4 K5 K6 K7
12 3
K8
Figure 8: Person 8 is known to be a knight. Three questions to him
suffice to find all identities in the chain formed by persons 1 to 7.
We now give a rough outline of the Chain Building Strategy, in which
these chains play a fundamental role. In the first step of the Chain Building
Strategy we hunt for someone who we can guarantee is a knight by first
building chains, starting a new chain as soon as we meet an accusation.
We then recursively link these chains by asking further questions (targeting
people with the most persuasive support so far) and stopping as soon as
we reach someone who must be a knight. In the second step we use our
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S1 S2
S3
K4
K5 K6 S7
S8 K9 S10
K14 K15 S16
K11
K12
S13
S17 K18
K19
1 2 3
4 5
6 7
10 11
8 9
12
13
14
15
Figure 9: The question graph after the first step of the Chain
Building Strategy in a room with 10 knights and 9 spies. Spies act
knavishly, with the exception of S8, who we suppose answers truth-
fully when asked about K9. As in Step 1 of the Spider Interrogation
Strategy, the members of the components containing S1 and S17 are
disregarded once it becomes clear (after questions 14 and 12 respec-
tively) that they contain at least as many spies as knights. The
first step ends after question 15, after which we can be sure that
person K15 is a knight. In Step 2, he will first be asked about S3,
bisecting the longest chain.
guaranteed knight to find everyone else’s identity, exploiting the existing
chains as much as possible. An example of the critical first step is shown in
Figure 9 above.
Simulation—both by hand, and by computer5—of the Chain Building
Strategy strongly suggests that, provided the behaviour of the spies is con-
strained in some way, or randomised entirely, it never requires more than
n+ `− 1 questions to find everyone’s identity. The numerical evidence also
suggests that Chain Building Strategy requires on average about 4n/3 ques-
tions to deal with a room in which knights are only just in the minority,
more than meeting the requirements of Conjecture 8. Sadly, it appears that
when ` is a smaller fraction of n, for example, ` = n/4, the strategy is
less effective. Some of the relevant data is presented in Figures 10 and 11
overleaf.
At the time of writing, these intermediate values for ` seem to present the
largest obstacle in the path to a proof of Conjecture 8.
5. Open problems and variant games
We end by presenting two further open problems, which seem worthy of
attention, and may well be more tractable than Conjecture 8.
Problem 9. In a 4k person room known to contain exactly k knights, what
is the smallest number of questions that will give a probability ≥ 1/5 of
correctly identifying every person?
5Objective-C source code for a program capable of simulating all the questioning strate-
gies discussed in this paper is available from http://www.maths.bris.ac.uk/~mazmjw.
16 MARK WILDON
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
number of questions
spyish chains
random chains
spyish spider
Figure 10: Numbers of questions asked in 25000 runs of the Chain
Building Strategy in random generated rooms with 51 knights and
49 spies. Results for spyish spies, and spies which answer randomly
are shown. One might expect the Chain Building Strategy to fare
significantly worse when faced with spyish spies, since this behaviour
certainly makes it harder to form long chains. However, the differ-
ence is surprisingly unpronounced, perhaps because the spies are
prone to give themselves away by their excessive accusations. For
comparison, the corresponding results obtained from simulation of
the Spider Interrogation Strategy with spyish spies are also shown.
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Figure 11: Mean number of questions asked in 1000 runs of the
Chain Building Strategy in randomly generated rooms with n peo-
ple when ` = b(n − 1)/2c and bn/4c respectively. In each case `
spies were present. The gradients of the interpolating lines are 1.316
and 1.217 respectively. Spies answered spyishly; other constraints on
their behaviour gave the same linear behaviour, with similar gradi-
ents.
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Now that we have dropped our long-standing assumption that spies are in
the minority, we can no longer guarantee to find everyone’s identity. How-
ever, there is still a chance of success. Indeed, if we ask all n(n − 1) useful
questions, then the spies must be careful not to give themselves away by
forming a block of > k people, all of its members supporting one another.
Instead, in the worst case we are left with four camps each of k people, each
camp behaving as if they are the knights, and the opposing camps are the
spies. Choosing a camp at random gives a 1/4 chance of success. Problem 9
asks whether, if we accept a smaller chance of success, we might be able to
manage with significantly fewer questions.
Problem 10. Let ` < n/2. In an n person room with at most ` spies,
what is the smallest number of questions that will guarantee to find at least
one person’s identity? What is the smallest number of questions that will
guarantee to find a knight?
For example, given the sequence of questions shown in Figure 1, we can
be sure after question 15 that person 15 is a knight (and also that person 18
is a spy), but before this question we cannot be certain of any single identity.
The Spider Interrogation Strategy shows that 2` − 1 questions suffice to
find a knight. This gives an upper bound for both parts of Problem 10.
For a lower bound, it is natural to pose the problem in the game-playing
framework of §3. The Mole Hiding Strategy shows that ` questions are
necessary, but cannot otherwise be recommended, for if the Interrogator
follows the Spider Interrogation Strategy, then after she has asked these `
questions, she will be able to claim.
The author conjectures that the answer to the first part—and hence to
both parts—of Problem 10 is 2`− 1. If so, we face the remarkable situation
that, while we can find the identity of a particular person, nominated in
advance, with 2` questions, we can only save one question if the person is
entirely of our choosing, to be nominated later.
In his famous ‘A Mathematician’s Apology ’ [3, §15–17], G. H. Hardy ar-
gued that serious mathematics could be distinguished by virtue of its depth
and generality, and also by a certain ‘unexpectedness, combined with in-
evitability and economy ’ (his emphasis). The reader who has read this far
will, it is hoped, agree that the Knights and Spies Problem deserves to
qualify under all of his criteria.
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